Bahrain, in a nutshell.

The mass protests in Bahrain are not all that we think they are. After the fall of leaders in Tunisia and Egypt and ensuing protests in Libya, Jordan, and Yemen, we have become accustomed to the relatively similar narrative of popular unrest fueled by poor employment prospects, autocratic governments led by corrupt, selfish and nepotist leaders and a cry for equity through representative government.

That narrative holds some water in the case of Bahrain, however, there are several key factors that are overlooked or misunderstood in current discussions. The case of Bahrain holds a confessional dimension that does not exist in the case of Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia; in addition there is a long history of clashes between Bahrain's Shi'a majority and the ruling family.

First, Bahrain's Shi'a majority is led by the Sunni al Khalifa clan, whose roots lie in Kuwait and Qatar. Their ascendancy to the throne in 1820 was made possible not by their ability to marshall their forces in Bahrain, but by treaties signed with the British, eventually becoming a British protectorate and colony.

Second, the ruling al Khalifa family has stayed in power by empowering its Sunni constituency while keeping the Shi'a in a general state of economic and political destitution. Formal segregation exists with the Shi'a restricted from many jobs, neighborhoods and opportunities that are reserved for Sunnis and allies of the royal family.

Third, though a largely stable and economically successful country, street violence is nothing new to Bahrain. Going back four decades, the Shi'a have demonstrated in the streets to protest the conditions they have been subjected to. When street protests erupted in 1973 and 1974, Emir Isa bin Salman al Khalifa, the ruler of Bahrain, dissolved the elected National Assembly and enacted the State Security Law of 1974, giving him carte blanche to prosecute what he saw as subversive elements. The Iranian Revolution only exacerbated the situation, as Emir Isa linked Shi'a opposition to Iranian supported terrorist organizations including Hezbollah. Neighboring Arab nations supported the government's crackdown, fearing their own Shi'a majorities would eventually rise up. It is important to note that clashes between the Shi'a and the al-Khalifa clan are exactly that - anti-government protests, and not anti-Sunni protests.

Fourth, Bahrain's Shi'a are disappointed with their experience with representative government since the reestablishment of the National Assembly in 2001. Initially promised that the Council of Representatives, the elected house of the National Assembly, would be the more powerful house, King Hamad reneged on his promise when he realized how powerful the Shi'a would be in such an assembly. Since the 2006 elections (Shi'a parties boycotted the 2002 election after King Hamad's undermining of the National Assembly), the Shi'a Islamist al Wefaq party has dominated elections, winning 17 out of 40 seats in 2006 elections and 18 out of 40 seats in the 2010 elections. These results do not demonstrate their real support however, as more than half of voters cast ballots for al Wefaq candidates, however due to gerrymandering, al Wefaq's representation remains below the 21 seats needed for a majority, though they did have alliances with Sunni liberal prior to the dissolution of the National Assembly.

What does this all mean? For one, it gives validity to Vali Nasr's assertion that there is a Shi'a revival in the Middle East (A book certainly worth reading). The protests in Bahrain also show that discontent with the direction of the country is not only limited to Shi'a, as there is also considerable Sunni participation in the protests. And the good news for the United States? While Bahrain's Shi'a are confessionally linked to Iran's Shi'a, Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has a far greater following. Though certainly not an American ally, Ayatollah Sistani's moderation and pragmatism led to Iraqi Shi'a participation in politics rather than violence (though the younger firebrand Moqtada al-Sadar would wish to see otherwise). He also disagrees with an Iranian style clerical government and opposes clerical involvement in politics.

In the end, Bahrain's neighbors stand to lose more than the United States, particularly if (or when) the protests succeed in overthrowing the royal family.